negotiating that the companies would rather he had not obtained, but spent virtually no time showing that he had used illegal means to do so. It spoke vaguely of bribery, but Hu was not even charged with bribery, to say nothing of being convicted of it.
12
The Humphrey/Yu case presented a similar issue. Although there was no question that the defendants had acquired information that fell within the definition of PIC, the law appropriately criminalizes acquiring PIC only when the means used are unlawful. Governments, businesses, and individuals hold vast amounts of personal information about other citizens, and the law should not and does not criminalize such holding in all cases. Consequently, it is critical for those in the business of information gathering-not an illegitimate activity per se-to know where the law draws the line. 13 Regrettably, as will be discussed below, the Humphrey/Yu case sheds no light on this issue whatsoever; the court, the prosecution, and the defense all seem to have ignored it entirely. In addition, the prosecution and the court ignored an important issue as to whether Article 253 applied to the facts of this case at all.
The broad issue raised by the case is whether the Chinese legal system can be counted on to operate in a relatively fair, impersonal manner, or whether it can be used as a tool by powerful parties to punish their enemies. One of the rumors swirling around the case held that Humphrey and Yu had, in their investigations, offended a person with former ties to GSK who had powerful connections within China's political-legal apparatus (政法系统) and that the case against them was one of selective prosecution. Similar concerns were raised in the Stern Hu case: while Hu was convicted of receiving bribes, no prosecutions were ever brought against those who had given the bribes.
importance of the issue of unlawfulness of means when acquiring PIC and the failure of the Shanghai court to clarify, or even acknowledge the existence of, the issue. Part IV will present the results of an extensive analysis of all reported convictions in Shanghai for the crime of illegally acquiring PIC from 2009, the year this crime was written into the Criminal Law, until August 14, 2014. Part V presents a conclusion.
II. Case Data
In order to understand how Shanghai courts have treated legal issues and factual circumstances in other cases involving the same charges, I examined all reported trials in Shanghai on charges of unlawful acquisition of PIC between 2009, when the act became a crime, and August 14, 2014. The dataset consists of 92 cases with over 200 defendants.
15 I examined only Shanghai cases because while one might not expect much consistency nationwide, it is reasonable to expect consistency within a highly-developed, urban provincial-level jurisdiction such as Shanghai, and therefore gross inconsistency, if present, is less likely to be accidental. Shanghai is also the provincial-level jurisdiction with the most cases of this crime. 16 The cases were examined for data about prison sentences (both fixed-term imprisonment (有期徒刑) and detention (拘留)), fines, amount of PIC acquired, the nature of the PIC, the source of the PIC, the price paid for the PIC, the means employed in acquiring the PIC, and any profits gained from the PIC.
The cases were gathered from the ChinaLawInfo legal database maintained by Beijing University. All cases were given an abbreviated English name, and all references to cases will use those English names.
17 Appendix A to this article provides a full citation, in both English and Chinese, and the URL of the case on the ChinaLawInfo web site; Appendix B provides a summary of information about the cases.
III. Did the Facts as Alleged Constitute a Crime Under Article 253?
A.
Does Article 253 Apply to Humphrey and Yu at All?
The part of Article 253 under which Humphrey and Yu were convicted was added to the Criminal Law in 2009. A close look suggests that, questions of unlawfulness of means aside, it is not even clear that the paragraphs in question were intended to apply to 15 Only one of the defendants seems to have been found innocent. The vast majority received punishment of some kind. A few were explicitly declared exempt from punishment for various reasons. For a very small number of defendants (always members of a group), the judgment mentions them at the beginning but does not state their ultimate fate. 16 During the period of time examined, there were ninety-two cases in Shanghai, thirty-seven in Zhejiang, twenty in Henan, nineteen in Beijing, and sixteen in Guangdong. Other provincial-level jurisdictions had fewer than ten each.
people like them or their company. Here is Paragraph 4 of Art. 253 under which they were charged and the surrounding language; I have added the paragraph numbers.
[3] Any staff member of a state organ or an entity in such a field as finance, telecommunications, transportation, education or medical treatment who, in violation of state provisions, sells or illegally provides to others personal information on citizens that was acquired during the organ's or entity's performance of duties or provision of services, shall, if the circumstances are serious, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention, and/or be fined. (国家机关或者金融、电信、交通、教育、医 疗等单位的工作人员，违反国家规定，将本单位在履行职责或者提供服务过程中获 得的公民个人信息，出售或者非法提供给他人，情节严重的，处三年以下有期徒刑 或者拘役，并处或者单处罚金。)
[4] Whoever illegally acquires the aforesaid information by stealing or any other means shall, if the circumstances are serious, be punished under the preceding paragraph. (窃取或者以其他方法非法获取上述信息，情节严重的，依照前款的规 定处罚。)
[5] Where an entity commits either of the crimes described in the preceding two paragraphs, it shall be fined, and the person in charge who is directly responsible and other directly responsible persons shall be punished under the applicable paragraph. (单位犯前两款罪的，对单位判处罚金，并对其直接负责的主管人员和 其他直接责任人员，依照各该款的规定处罚。)
It seems clear that this rule is aimed at cases where an organization legitimately acquires information about citizens in the course of its functions, and employees then sell this information to others behind the organization's back. That is Paragraph 3, in any case, and it applies to suppliers of information. Although the prosecution made much of Humphrey and Yu being a suppliers of personal information (to their clients), 18 it seems quite a stretch to apply Paragraph 3 to them. First, they were not charged with unlawfully supplying PIC to anyone. (Somewhat troublingly, the prosecution devoted considerable time during the trial to arguing that they had done so; since the issue was entirely irrelevant to the charges brought against them, it was purely prejudicial and not probative.) Second, the organization of which they were staff members was their own company; they cannot be said to have misappropriated information from ChinaWhys.
What about Paragraph 4? Note that while Paragraph 4 applies to receivers of information, it is still limited to the type of information referred to in Paragraph 3: information acquired by some organization in the course of performing its functions. Thus, it does not apply to all cases in which someone illegally acquires personal information. For example, if a burglar breaks into a house and steals the homeowner's address book, that could well be deemed acquiring personal information about citizens through unlawful means, but it is not "the aforesaid information." If Paragraph 4 was 18 See Trial Transcript, supra note 4. meant to cover PIC in general, it is hard to understand why it does not simply say so, instead of saying "the aforesaid information."
It is of course possible that Humphrey and Yu acquired some personal information through illegal means, but neither the transcript nor the judgment show any effort by the prosecution or the court respectively to show that it was in the category of information "acquired during the organ's or entity's performance of duties or provision of services".
In 2013, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuracy, and the Ministry of Public Security issued a joint notice 19 about this particular crime, but it does not change the above analysis. If anything, it underscores the point that the revised Art. 253 was about something quite different from what Humphrey and Yu were doing. It was about the problem of employees of various institutions that hold a great deal of personal information selling that information on a massive scale to middlemen, who would then resell it to "illegal" investigative companies for purposes such as "illegal" debt collection.
(I do not know where the line between legal and illegal is in the above cases.) Duan Wanjin, a lawyer for Humphrey, in fact argued that the source of the information did not meet the requirements of the law; 20 neither the prosecution nor the court addressed the argument, even just to dismiss it. But although this failure to address the issue is unfortunate, it does not appear to be unusual in the Shanghai court system. Even though there is very respectable scholarly support for the narrow reading of "the aforesaid information," 21 no Shanghai court has adopted this reading. Instead, they have adopted an expansive view that equates "the aforesaid information" with PIC tout court, and have held defendants criminally liable even where there was no finding on the source of the information. 
B.
What Constitutes "Personal Information of Citizens"?
Three views exist among Chinese legal scholars as to what constitutes PIC. One view defines PIC as any information that enables one to discern the individual identity of a person-for example, name, occupation, position, age, marital status, education, professional qualifications, work experience, address, telephone number, credit card number, finger prints, or online username and password. 23 A broader interpretation defines PIC as any information, existing in any format, that relates to a person and that can also identify a specific individual-that is, any information, data, or circumstances concerning a person. 24 A third view limits PIC to information closely related to citizenship and personality, owned by the person, unrelated to public life, and unknown to the general public. 25 This last view incorporates a kind of expectation-of-privacy analysis into the definition of PIC, with four theories on how the expectation could be established: (1) a pure subjective test; (2) a pure objective test; (3) a mixed test, where there must be both an objective and actual subjective expectation of privacy; and (4) a disjunctive test, where either a subjective or an objective expectation of privacy is sufficient.
The Shanghai courts appear to have adopted the broadest definition: any information concerning a person is PIC for purposes of paragraph 4. No Shanghai case has inquired into expectation of privacy. The Humphrey/Yu case does not appear to be unusual in this respect.
C. The Requirement of Unlawfulness of Method
One of the most disturbing aspects of the proceedings is the almost complete lack of attention paid to a critical element of the crime with which Humphrey and Yu were charged: the element of unlawfulness in the collection of information. Note that while Paragraph 3 of Article 253 covers those who supply PIC, it does not cover those who acquire it. Only Paragraph 4 does that, 26 and it covers only the unlawful acquisition of PIC.
In the vast majority of cases in the dataset, covering 139 defendants, the PIC was acquired by purchase. With seventeen defendants, the PIC was traded for other PIC. With six defendants, the PIC was acquired by theft. With four defendants, the PIC was acquired by stalking a particular individual. And with three defendants, the PIC was acquired through some kind of trick. Thirty-one defendants were found to have "acquired" (获取) PIC without a discussion of method. In those cases, the court usually used the phrased "unlawfully acquired," without any discussion of the unlawfulness. Because Paragraph 4 does not criminalize the mere acquisition of PIC but attaches a condition of illegality to the method, it is necessary to figure out what methods are illegal. Although Paragraph 3 makes selling PIC illegal under the conditions stated, Paragraph 4 mentions only theft, but not purchase or mere receipt. 27 No doubt acquiring PIC by fraud or hacking would be covered, assuming the specific acts in question were per se illegal. 28 Nevertheless, Shanghai courts have in many cases found defendants guilty of unlawful acquisition where the information was purchased, without a specific finding that the purchase was in some way unlawful.
This murkiness surrounding the requirement of unlawfulness represents a significant threat to anyone engaged in the business of collecting information, even for purposes generally considered legitimate. For example, although legal scholars did not expect Paragraph 4 to reach creditors seeking to locate debtors, 29 Shanghai courts have found private investigators engaged in debt collection activities guilty under Paragraph 4 without any inquiry into the lawfulness of their methods.
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Although the failure of Shanghai courts in general and the Humphrey/Yu court in particular to shed any helpful light on the issue of unlawfulness of method is regrettable, it is nevertheless not unusual, and so the Humphrey/Yu case cannot be considered an outlier in that respect. Still, the court's treatment of the facts warrants discussion.
Although there was very little disagreement about the facts in this case, much of the trial-well over half-was devoted to establishing things that were not really in question. The critical question is what the legal effect of those facts should be.
For example, the prosecution devoted some time to establishing that ChinaWhys's projects had code names. What this has to do with the charges was not made clear. The prosecution also apparently thought the following facts needed to be established and were important:
• The defendants or their agents had bought and sold information. The prosecution's main accusation was that the defendants had paid Zhou Hongbo, Liu Yu, and Cai Zhicheng from 800 to 2,000 yuan per item for a total of 256 items of PIC, including information about domicile registration, border entry and exit Xue 2012 , XXX 2012b records, and mobile telephone numbers, 31 and had then after compiling investigation reports sold this information to clients.
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• The defendants or their agents had hired people to watch a target. (Note that as far as the evidence showed, the watching involved someone sitting outside the target's office for three hours.)
• The defendants had followed (跟踪) people.
• The defendants had "monitored" (监控) people. (No evidence was introduced on this point; the defense's response was that the prosecution got this idea from a misunderstanding of the term "monitoring" used in ChinaWhys's reports, where it simply meant things like tracking news about a company or individual.)
• The defendants had hired a non-mainland (境外) company to engage in following and monitoring targets. (This was part of the prosecution's legal argument and was not supported by any evidence introduced in the factual part of the trial.)
• The defendants or their agents had pretended to be relatives or clients of various people when seeking information.
• The defendants had, between January 2009 and June 2013, performed consulting services for 78 clients and received almost 21 million yuan in fees. Some specific clients-not including GSK-were named in the judgment.
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• The defendants had an illegal purpose in collecting the information. (The prosecution didn't say what that purpose was; the defense argued out that their purpose was to conduct their business and was not illegal.)
The prosecution did not, however, make any argument or cite any authority in support of its assertion that these methods were illegal. Nevertheless, the court seems to have taken it for granted that these methods are indeed illegal. Indeed, in the judgment, the court specifically says, "The two [defendants] knew that to acquire personal information of citizens by means of purchase is unlawful." 34 This is of tremendous significance. If buying and selling cell phone numbers is illegal, for example, then millions of individuals and companies in China are criminals.
The response of the defense to this issue of illegality of methods seemed ambivalent. In some places in the transcript, it argued that what the defendants did was to pay for investigative services, which is not prohibited by law. Thus, the requirement of illegality of method was not met. Elsewhere, though, the defense made what seem to be astonishing concessions. According to the judgment, the defense conceded that the acts 31 See Trial Judgment, supra note 4, at 2. 32 Note, however, that Humphrey and Yu were not formally charged with the unlawful sale of PIC. 33 See Trial Judgment, supra note 4, at 5-6. 34 See Trial Judgment, supra note 4, at 9. in question were unlawful, but argued that the defendants did not know they were unlawful at the time and that the circumstances were not serious. 35 The transcript quotes one of the defendants' attorneys, Zhai Jian, as saying, "The acts of the defendants in this case are unlawful, because neither individuals nor commercial entities have the right to acquire citizens' personal information about their families, their entering and leaving the country, and their mobile phone communications via the method of paying for it."
36 He goes on to say that in pre-trial conferences with the defendants, he has ascertained that in their own countries, information on entering and leaving the country as well as mobile phone communications are considered strictly private, and "therefore the defendants' collecting of such information is unlawful."
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This argument seems questionable in a number of respects. First and most obviously, what other countries do cannot determine Chinese law, although obviously it bears on whether the defendants thought they were doing something wrong. Second, this statement conflates the issue of what counts as PIC with the issue of whether collecting it is unlawful. Art. 253 criminalizes only the unlawful collection of PIC, so deciding that something should be considered PIC does not end the inquiry into criminal liability.
Third, and most important, Zhai is as silent as the prosecution on the source for his statement about the applicable law. It is sometimes said in jest that in China, everything not specifically permitted is forbidden, but this really is nothing more than a jest. No legal system could possibly function this way. Chinese law does not specifically permit any of the million actions we take every day, from brushing our teeth to watching Korean soap operas; this does not make us criminals. A statement that it is unlawful to do something needs support. Again, if Zhai and the prosecution are right about this, China is awash in criminals whose offenses are far worse than those of Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng.
IV.
Are the Humphrey/Yu Sentences Exceptional Compared with Other Shanghai Cases?
A. Introduction
This part of the article presents the results of an analysis of the case dataset with a focus on the sentences. As will be discussed in more detail below, I conclude that while gaps in information make certainty impossible, the weight of the evidence suggests that the sentences imposed on Humphrey and Yu-Humphrey was given a heavier sentence than any other defendant in the entire dataset-were far out of line with sentences imposed on other defendants when the relevant facts are compared. At the very least, the analysis supports shifting the burden of argument and proof to those who would assert that the trial was fair and the sentences proportionate.
B.
The Question of "Serious Circumstances"
In general
Even if all the factual predicates for the crime are present, it is not clear that they rise to the level of criminality under the Criminal Law. This is because Chinese criminal law has a general rule (Art. 13) that an act is not a crime where "the circumstances are clearly minor and the harm is not great" (情节显著轻微危害不大). In addition, both Paragraph 3 and Paragraph 4 explicitly contain a requirement of serious circumstances.
Sometimes the Supreme People's Court will come up with an interpretation of what constitutes "serious circumstances" in particular crimes. Unfortunately, there is no such interpretation or other official guidance available here. Among Chinese scholars, there are varying views as to what constitutes "serious circumstances" under Article 253. Among the candidate factors are (1) a large quantity of PIC; (2) illegal purpose; (3) severe or malicious means; (4) severe harm to a person (bodily, economic, social, or emotionalfor example, when suicide results); (5) multiple infringements; (6) social disruption; (7) where PIC leaves the country; (8) multiple victims; (9) large profits; (10) forming an illegal network for the procurement and distribution of PIC; (11) the amount paid for PIC; (12) multiple PIC-related convictions; (13) criminal use; (14) nature of PIC (for example, financial, medical, or marital); and (15) acquiring PIC of disabled persons or illegitimate children.
38

"Serious circumstances" in the dataset
Academic analyses are one thing, judicial practice another. In practice, courts in the dataset rarely analyzed the issue of serious circumstances and offered only a conclusory statement that the circumstances were serious. Twenty-three cases, however, did mention something extra in the section of the judgment finding serious circumstances. The circumstances mentioned in these cases included joint commission, purchase, online purchase, collective purchase, purchase of a large amount of PIC, profits, and (mysteriously) "other means," suggesting that these constitute serious circumstances. 39 One of the more specific cases mentioned collective acquisition and sale of PIC. 40 Many cases did indeed involve circumstances that might fairly be deemed serious. In several cases, the defendant made a large profit from the sale of PIC, 44 or the defendant was engaged in the business of collecting and distributing PIC. 45 In general, in cases where a large amount of PIC was involved, the courts found it less necessary to discuss other serious circumstances.
Overall, the general picture that emerges from the dataset regarding the requirement of serious circumstances is that (a) judgments rarely discuss the "serious circumstances" requirement specifically, preferring to rely on conclusory statements, and (b) judgments do mention various facts about the case that might constitute grounds for finding the presence of serious circumstances, even though they are not specifically labelled as such.
The following discussion presents an analysis of the dataset in tabular form. It examines in detail only cases with prison sentences of one year or more, because the standards the Shanghai courts appear to employ are clearer in these cases. Cases featuring sentences of less than one year, and especially sentences of six months or less, vary a great deal in their facts, and it is difficult to make meaningful inferences. The information, however, is all compiled in Appendix B. Tables 1, 2 , and 3 show cases where the sentence was a prison term of 12 months, 13-17 months, and 18-24 months respectively. Although the maximum term is 36 months, no defendant other than Peter Humphrey was sentenced to more than 24 months (Humphrey was sentenced to 30 months). Table 4 shows cases involving private investigators or persons engaging in similar activities. In addition to the case name, prison term, and fine, each table sets forth the amount of PIC, the nature of the PIC, the means of acquisition, and any serious circumstances. a) Table 1 In general, when the quantity of PIC is less, there are usually more serious circumstances present that justify a heavy sentence. For example, Qian 2014 involved a public official, and the PIC was used for harassment and intimidation. In Hua 2013, the amount of PIC involved was modest, but the profit was relatively large. On the other 41 XXX 2012a (in contravention of state laws and regulations); XXX 2012b (same). 42 Zhou 2010 ("The number of PIC is so large that circumstances are serious (数量之大情节严重)."); Lan 2011 (same). 43 Wu 2012 (illegal purchase); Chen 2012 (same). 44 See, e.g., Lu 2014; Ye 2013; Zhu 2012b. 45 See, e.g., Wu 2013; Lu 2013b; XXX 2012a; Hou 2012. hand, in Shanghai 2012, the circumstances were not as serious, but there was a large amount of PIC involved.
Note that in Ye 2013 and Zhu 2012b, Table 1 shows only accomplices sentenced to one-year prison terms, whereas the principals are found in Table 3 , having each received terms of 18 months. Table 2 Here we see the same pattern as in Table 3 Here, almost every case has serious circumstances coupled with a large amount of PIC. In addition, there are seven principals here and only one accessory. In the case of the accessory in Mu 2014, there were additional serious circumstances that warranted a heavy sentence.
Most important, however, are the heaviest sentences. For cases where the prison term was twenty months or more, either the amount of PIC involved was enormous or there were very serious circumstances. There are no private investigator cases in Table 3 , and that the lowest amount of PIC involved is 70,000 items. 
"Serious circumstances" in the Humphrey/Yu case
In the Humphrey/Yu case, the defendants' lawyers argued that the requirement of "serious circumstances" was not met; the prosecution argued that it was. The relevant facts apparently involved how many items of personal information were acquired, the purpose for which they were acquired, whether the defendants made a lot of money, and the general social danger of their activities.
The arguments made during the trial in the Humphrey/Yu case about facts and their significance break down roughly as follows:
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Issue
Prosecution Defense
Amount of information acquired
A large amount: 256 items.
A small amount: 256 items.
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Motivation To make money. 1. Of course to make money; we were a business.
2. To contribute to anti-corruption efforts. In about 90% of the cases investigated, initial suspicions turned out to be accurate.
Amount of money made
"Huge" (citing gross revenues).
It is misleading to look at gross revenues; one must deduct costs.
Social danger
What kind of society would it be if people could be watched and followed 24 hours a day, with secret photos taken of them?
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There was actually very little personal information taken, that which was taken was not all passed on to clients in reports, and that which was passed on was not used for bad purposes. The defense also noted that some of the prosecution's claims had no foundation in any evidence they brought before the court. There was, for example, a single instance of following someone. Someone was stationed outside the target's office for three hours. The prosecution's evidence showed nothing else. No evidence of secret photo-taking of people was introduced. 50 The source for the following table is Trial Transcript, supra note 4.
51 Readers with long memories will recall the scene from the film Annie Hall (available at https://youtu.be/O7nPkpdFAic), where the lead characters, on a split screen, discuss their sex lives with their psychiatrists and display widely different interpretations of the same number.
In the judgment, the court found the following elements to constitute the necessary serious circumstances: (a) the defendants wrote their investigative reports in order to make a profit; 53 (b) the activity was carried on for a long time (four years); (c) the PIC involved covered a wide variety of types and was large in amount; 54 and (d) the PIC acquired was unlawfully 55 provided to clients inside and outside mainland China, with the result that the privacy and information security of citizens was directly infringed upon.
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When the circumstances of the Humphrey/Yu case are compared with the circumstances of Shanghai cases in the dataset, the virtually inescapable conclusion is that the sentences meted out to Humphrey and Yu are extreme outliers and do not reflect the usual judicial practice in Shanghai. The heaviest prison sentence for unlawful acquisition in Shanghai prior to the Humphrey/Yu case-in a set of over 90 cases and over 200 defendants-was 24 months. The maximum sentence under the Criminal Law is 36 months, and Humphrey was sentenced to 30 months (including the roughly one year spent in pre-trial detention). This sentence cannot be explained by the relatively paltry amount of PIC involved (256 items) or other circumstances mentioned in the trial transcript or the judgment. This conclusion is reinforced by looking at cases involving private investigators in particular. As previously noted, Humphrey was sentenced to 30 months in prison. Prior to the Humphrey case, the longest prison sentence any private investigator in Shanghai had received was 12 months. Humphrey was found to have acquired about 250 pieces of PICmore than in most of the private investigator cases, but far less than in any of the Table 2  or Table 3 cases involving sentences of over 12 months. The Humphrey/Yu case appears to be the first one in which the defendant was investigating corporate misconduct, but it would seem odd for the court to deem this "serious circumstances." Certainly the court did not make anything of this fact in its judgment. 53 Neither the prosecution nor the court, in the trial transcript and the judgment, provide any figures for profits allegedly obtained by the defendants as a result of unlawful acquisition of PIC. The judgment stated that ChinaWhys had had gross revenues of approximately 21 million yuan from January 2009 to June 2013, see supra note 33 and accompanying text, but did not derive any profit figures from this or attribute specific profits to specific acts of unlawful acquisition of PIC. It is worth recalling here that the case was under investigation for over a year prior to the trial. 54 As noted above, 256 items is in fact a trivially small amount of PIC in the universe of Shanghai cases. 55 Note that the defendants were not charged with unlawfully providing PIC; the judgment makes this assertion but does not really support it. 56 The language here is virtually a direct quotation from the text of the judgment. See Trial Judgment, supra note 4, at 10. 
V. Conclusion
The Humphrey/Yu judgment is in many ways a disappointment. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Humphrey and Yu engaged in acts that the Chinese government has a legitimate interest in prohibiting, knew that they were doing so, and deserve to be punished, the case does little or nothing to inform others who wish These problems, it should be noted, are not necessarily failings of the Humphrey/Yu judgment in particular; such vagueness pervades other judgments in unlawful acquisition cases. As a result, a legitimate industry-that of business intelligence-remains under a very threatening cloud. Indeed, any number of activities and businesses outside the realm of business intelligence are under a cloud as well, since a wide variety of activities involve the provision or collection of PIC as broadly defined, and the case offers no guidance as to when such provision or collection will be deemed illegal.
The case is even more troubling once we abandon the above assumptions. A comparison of the Humphrey/Yu case with all other cases in Shanghai provides very strong circumstantial evidence that their case was not simply an ordinary criminal case. Humphrey's sentence was by far the heaviest ever imposed in an unlawful acquisition case, and the sentences for both Humphrey and Yu were conspicuously heavy given the relatively small amount of PIC involved and the apparent absence of other serious circumstances. The sentences are also outliers when compared with those imposed on other private investigators. Even the court that tried Humphrey and Yu did not treat the case as an ordinary criminal case; although court judgments are supposed to be published on the court's web site in the absence of specific reasons not t0 (none of which, such as national security, were present in this case), the court never published the judgment and is apparently guarding it as a secret.
A final disturbing aspect of the case unrelated to the defendants is that one of the witnesses was a foreign lawyer resident in China and working at a Chinese law firm. According to the judgment, the lawyer testified-I presume reluctantly, but do not know-that a certain firm had hired ChinaWhys to investigate one or more employees.
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If the firm was a client of the Chinese law firm, this suggests that clients cannot expect strong confidentiality protections when dealing with Chinese law firms.
In short, the case offers little help to those who wish to comply with Chinese law other than to give up all information-gathering activities that might result in the receipt of information about individuals, and it offers little reassurance to those who suspect that the legal system can be used as a tool by those with sufficient influence and the will to wield it. 
APPENDIX B: CASE DATA
The following is a compilation of all the data used in this research. The cases are arranged by date, beginning with the earliest. The amount of PIC, the nature of the PIC, and the means of acquisition are also listed. In the rightmost column, "Serious Circumstances," certain aspects of the case that could be construed as serious circumstances or relevant for sentencing are listed. The term "EXEMPT" means that the defendant was found guilty of unlawful acquisition but for other reasons was exempted from punishment. In the Zhou 2010 case, a number of defendants were found guilty but their sentences were not mentioned. Here the table will show a question mark. For certain cases, such as Xu 2013b, the court filtered the PIC for duplicates. Where this is the case, the PIC amount will have the initial number and following it the number excluding duplicates in parentheses. The full citation for the cases is found in Appendix A. 
